The Rise of Populist Parties in Europe: The Dark Side of Globalisation and Technological Change

Globalisation and technological change are usually considered welfare-enhancing developments by economists. This proposal sheds light on potentially very important political, social and economic costs that have, until very recently, been neglected: the recent rise of populist and nationalist movements, possibly leading to political disintegration of the European Project.
We start from the observation that trade integration and technological change can lead to growing regional disparities in labour market outcomes if import-competing regions lose jobs on a large scale (Autor et al. 2013; Dauth et al. 2014), or if regions are specialised in jobs which can be replaced by new technologies such as industrial robots (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2017). Some early economic studies point towards a direct link between import competition at the regional level and extreme political views (Autor et al. 2016; Dippel et al. 2015). We aim to develop this emerging literature by highlighting whether globalisation and technological/structural changes increase vote shares of populist and nationalist parties because of the economic hardships caused by these phenomena. We provide up to date and comparable evidence for European regions and also explore whether transfer payments via European Union (EU) structural funds mitigate these effects. We extend this basic analysis by focussing on the three specific cases of the Czech Republic, Germany, and the United Kingdom to provide a clear understanding of (i) which type of hardships matter, (ii) which subgroups are affected, (iii) whether individual-level or regional-level hardships matter and (iv) the individual-level economic mechanisms behind the rise of populism.
Methodologically, we will deploy both microeconometric and experimental tools to identify causal relationships between exogenous trigger events (e.g. import shocks, robot use, refugee inflow) and outcome variables (labour market, election outcomes and populist sentiments. We will make use of survey, experimental and administrative data at both aggregate (regional) and individual levels.
The ultimate goal of the project is to assess whether economic hardship, caused by forces hitting open economies - typically viewed as being beyond the control of individual voters and national authorities - can explain the recent success of populist and nationalist movements in the EU. In establishing whether economics matters, and for whom, which type of hardships matter, and whether EU structural funds are a means to mitigate the rise of anti-EU tendencies we provide guidance to European and national policy makers concerned with the future of the EU and open democratic societies.