Public guarantees and allocative efficiency

Part 1: Takes advantage of a natural experiment, in which long-standing public guarantees were removed for a set of German banks following a lawsuit. Project identifies the effects of these guarantees on the allocation of credit ("allocative efficiency"). Using matched bank/firm data we find that public guarantees reduce allocative efficiency. With guarantees in place poorly performing firms invest more and maintain higher rates of sales growth. Moreover, firms produce less efficiently in the presence of public guarantees. Consistently, we show that guarantees reduce the likelihood that firms exit the market.

Part 2: We examine the effect of regulatory forbearance during crises on subsequent productivity growth. We estimate regulatory forbearance in different US MSAs and show that subsequent real growth rates, employment rates and other variables related to productivity are higher if forbearance was lower, i.e. more banks during the crisis were closed rather than saved.
Part 3: We examine the effect of redlining rules (i.e. rules that force banks to lend into low income neighbourhoods) on the supply of credit in those neighborhoods and  housing price growth. The identification relies on differences in the level legislation eligible areas (census tracks) due to differences in MSA level household income. We find that that mortgage credit supply and house price growth in the run up to the 2008/2009 financial crisis was higher in eligible areas compared to otherwise similar non-eligible areas. The paper thus identifies "redlining" as one central cause of the financial crisis.