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FAKULTÄT FÜR
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Lehrstuhl BWL, insb. Unternehmensrechnung und Controlling

LEHRSTUHL BWL, INSB. UNTERNEHMENSRECHNUNG UND CONTROLLING

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1. LEITUNG

Prof. Dr. Barbara Schöndube-Pirchegger

2. HOCHSCHULLEHRER/INNEN

Prof. Dr. Barbara Schöndube-Pirchegger

3. FORSCHUNGSPROFIL

Die Forschungsprojekte am Lehrstuhl befassen sich mit der Analyse von Verhaltenssteuerungsproblemen bei asymmetrischer Information und strategischer Interaktion in Unternehmen. Zentrale Themen sind die Wahl und der geeignete Einsatz von Performancemaßen, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Rechnungswesengrößen, die Analyse von Corporate Governance- und Organisationsstrukturen sowie die Kontrolle von Informationsströmen im Unternehmen.

Methodisch kommen spieltheoretische, empirische sowie experimentelle Ansätze zur Anwendung.

4. KOOPERATIONEN

- Dipl.-Kfm. Tim Hensel
- Dipl.-Kfm. Tim Hensel, Leibniz Universität Hannover
- Dr. Barbara Pirchegger
- M.Sc. Nicola Bethmann, Leibniz Universität Hannover
- Prof. Dr. Christian Lukas
- Prof. Dr. Christian Lukas, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
- Prof. Dr. Guido Voigt, Universität Hamburg
- Prof. Dr. Jens Robert Schöndube
- Prof. Dr. Jens Robert Schöndube, Leibniz Universität Hannover

5. FORSCHUNGSPROJEKTE

Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Barbara Schöndube-Pirchegger, Jun.-Prof. Dr. Max-Frederik Neubert
Förderer: Haushalt - 15.05.2018 - 31.12.2021

Costs and benefits of discretion in performance evaluation and patterns of bias

This paper investigates incentive effects from subjective performance evaluation in an agency setting. A manager (agent) is evaluated by his superior (principal) via a subjective performance report. Naturally, the superior is able to distort the report. Assuming a fairness-sensitive manager, his response to a perceived reporting bias is not straightforward. His reaction to an undervaluation is always negative, his reaction to overvaluation, in contrast, not unequivocally positive, due to fairness issues. Within this setting, we find that reporting discretion can be either beneficial or detrimental to the principal. In particular, the option to bias renders incentive provision more costly but also reduces the agent's exposure to risk in the optimal contract. Moreover, we find that frequently observed bias patterns such as centrality bias and leniency bias arise endogenously in our model.

Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Barbara Schöndube-Pirchegger
Förderer: Haushalt - 01.06.2018 - 01.06.2022

Internal and External Hiring of Employees- Costs and Benefits

A firm that has an open position to fill can typically choose from various candidates. In particular, it can decide to promote some employee from inside the firm or, alternatively, hire a candidate from outside. Empirical observations show that both, internal and external hiring, takes place on various levels of hierarchy.

In this project, we investigate what drives the choice of either external or internal hiring. Moreover, we analyze the consequences of that choice for incentive contracting.

To do so, we assume that internal candidates are better informed about the firm itself, the position to fill and the possible achievements from filling the position as opposed external candidates. From that perspective, the choice for an internal versus an external candidate boils down to the question of whether to hire someone with more or less private information trading off more information and larger information asymmetry against less information combined with less information asymmetry. Formally, we compare an agency problem with moral hazard and adverse selection to a pure moral hazard problem.

Early results show that it depends critically on the differences in types whether hiring an internal or an external candidate results in higher expected payoffs for the firm. The same is true for the optimal intensity of incentives provided.