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UNIVERSITÄT  
MAGDEBURG

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FAKULTÄT FÜR  
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# Forschungsbericht 2020

Lehrstuhl BWL, insb. Unternehmensrechnung und Controlling

# LEHRSTUHL BWL, INSB. UNTERNEHMENSRECHNUNG UND CONTROLLING

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## 1. LEITUNG

Prof. Dr. Barbara Schöndube-Pirchegger

## 2. HOCHSCHULLEHRER/INNEN

Prof. Dr. Barbara Schöndube-Pirchegger

## 3. FORSCHUNGSPROFIL

Die Forschungsprojekte am Lehrstuhl befassen sich mit der Analyse von Verhaltenssteuerungsproblemen bei asymmetrischer Information und strategischer Interaktion in Unternehmen. Zentrale Themen sind die Wahl und der geeignete Einsatz von Performancemaßen, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Rechnungswesengrößen, die Analyse von Corporate Governance- und Organisationsstrukturen sowie die Kontrolle von Informationsströmen im Unternehmen.

Methodisch kommen spieltheoretische, empirische sowie experimentelle Ansätze zur Anwendung.

## 4. KOOPERATIONEN

- Dipl.-Kfm. Tim Hensel
- Dipl.-Kfm. Tim Hensel, Leibniz Universität Hannover
- Dr. Barbara Pirchegger
- M.Sc. Nicola Bethmann, Leibniz Universität Hannover
- Prof. Dr. Christian Lukas
- Prof. Dr. Christian Lukas, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
- Prof. Dr. Guido Voigt, Universität Hamburg
- Prof. Dr. Jens Robert Schöndube
- Prof. Dr. Jens Robert Schöndube, Leibniz Universität Hannover

## 5. FORSCHUNGSPROJEKTE

**Projektleitung:** Prof. Dr. Barbara Schöndube-Pirchegger  
**Förderer:** Haushalt - 01.06.2018 - 01.06.2022

### **Internal and External Hiring of Employees- Costs and Benefits**

A firm that has an open position to fill can typically choose from various candidates. In particular, it can decide to promote some employee from inside the firm or, alternatively, hire a candidate from outside. Empirical observations show that both, internal and external hiring, takes place on various levels of hierarchy.

In this project, we investigate what drives the choice of either external or internal hiring. Moreover, we analyze the consequences of that choice for incentive contracting.

To do so, we assume that internal candidates are better informed about the firm itself, the position to fill and the possible achievements from filling the position as opposed external candidates. From that perspective, the choice for an internal versus an external candidate boils down to the question of whether to hire someone with more or less private information trading off more information and larger information asymmetry against less information combined with less information asymmetry. Formally, we compare an agency problem with moral hazard and adverse selection to a pure moral hazard problem.

Early results show that it depends critically on the differences in types whether hiring an internal or an external candidate results in higher expected payoffs for the firm. The same is true for the optimal intensity of incentives provided.

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**Projektleitung:** Prof. Dr. Barbara Schöndube-Pirchegger, Jun.-Prof. Dr. Max-Frederik Neubert  
**Förderer:** Haushalt - 15.05.2018 - 31.12.2021

### **A model on reactions to biased subjective performance evaluations**

This work adds an explanation for centrality and leniency biases in subjective performance evaluations. An agency model is used to show that superiors deliberately manipulate the results of subjective evaluations in order to control the reactions of fairness-sensitive employees to the evaluation result. Besides examining their determinants, the paper illustrates economic consequences of such biases.

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**Projektleitung:** M.Sc. Dominic Jamm  
**Förderer:** Haushalt - 01.01.2017 - 01.01.2021

### **Intra-Organizational Knowledge Creation and Sharing in a Principal-Agent Setting**

In the resource-based view of the firm, organizational knowledge and expertise are recognized as primary drivers of continuous innovation and competitive advantage. However, as an intangible resource knowledge resides within individuals who personally value their skills and therefore have an implicit incentive to keep knowledge private. Consequently, it is necessary for organizations to provide adequate rewards to control the diffusion and utilization of knowledge among their employees. The purpose of this paper is to develop and analyze a reward structure that motivates agents to generate additional knowledge and subsequently share it with co-workers. In this context, creation and sharing are considered costly actions that, in turn, decrease the cost of providing an output-oriented effort. The optimal incentive structure is derived to balance the explicit incentives of monetary rewards and the implicit benefits associated with a higher level of private knowledge. The model suggests that organizations need to choose whether they want to emphasize either the creation or dissemination of knowledge. The optimal effort level for sharing knowledge depends not only on an agent's personal incentive, but more importantly on the marginal productivity and the incentive of other agents to efficiently apply the shared knowledge. However, stronger incentives to generate knowledge have a detrimental effect on each agents' willingness to share and vice versa. The findings in this paper should help to further understand organizational learning and the transfer of developed knowledge. Furthermore, it provides insights into the trade-off between the creation and sharing of knowledge, which should aid managers to better design incentive contracts for employees to focus their attention on the desired task.

