Equilibrium disclosure and the value of accounting information in a tournament
In this project we analyze a principal's disclosure incentives in a tournament setting. A principal hires two agents to perform two tasks each. The principal can install an information system that with some probability provides him with a signal about the agent's productivities. The signal is predecision information in the sense that if the principal reports the signal to the agents, it affects their effort allocation. Having installed the information system, the principal may have an incentive to withhold the signal if its disclosure induces the agents to choose a more balanced effort allocation. The reason is that the principal prefers the agents to specialize in one task while the agents prefer a more even allocation of effort due to convex disutility of working hard. We investigate how this conflict of interest affects equilibrium disclosure incentives. Furthermore, we analyze the value of the information system for the principal and derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the information system having positive value.